

Items in **BLACK** are near verbatim to DOJ v. Apple complaint in NJD
 Items in **RED** have some significant overlap to Isaacs v. Apple, cv-5567-EMC FAC.
 Items in **BLUE** are unique to CRC FAC

Of the FAC's 102 pages, about 60 are verbatim DOJ content, about 27 have substantive overlap with Isaacs, and about 15 are unique to either. A significant number of key events alleged in the FAC occurred after 2022, notably including four years of \$99 class action fees totaling over \$2billion, and therefore were not possibly referenced in Case No. 5567.

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